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Power is a ubiquitous feature of many social structures. In 
today’s society, power hierarchies emerge to facilitate and 
streamline task performance and group decision-making 
(Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Van Vugt, 2006). To this end, it is 
necessary for individuals in a power hierarchy, be they in high-
power or low-power positions, to perform optimally in pursuit 
of goals. However, extensive research shows that power hier-
archies differentially affect performance and goal pursuit of 
high-power and low-power individuals. Notably, while having 
power facilitates self-regulatory processes and goal-directed 
behavior, lack of power has been found to consistently hamper 
those processes (for a review, see Guinote, 2017). Critically, 
research has found that lack of power impairs executive func-
tions—a set of basic cognitive control processes that guide 
selection and monitoring of behaviors to facilitate goal 
achievement—that results in a performance gap between the 
powerless and the powerful (Diamond, 2013; Guinote, 2017; 
Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008). It is therefore 
imperative, from both theoretical and practical perspectives, to 
identify strategies and interventions that could mitigate the 
cognitive decrements of the powerless. Attempts at discover-
ing such interventions become even more relevant considering 
that the powerless outnumber the powerful in social hierar-
chies, and that it is far more common for individuals to 
experience situations that induce powerlessness in everyday 
life (Smith & Hofmann, 2016).
Surprisingly, however, research addressing these theoreti-
cal and practical gaps is scarce, and so far, only limited to the 
study of factors specific to the structure of power hierarchies. 
For instance, research demonstrates that when power posi-
tions are illegitimate and unstable, the powerless show 
increased approach-related tendencies (Lammers, Galinsky, 
Gordijn, & Otten, 2008) and goal-directed behavior (Willis, 
Guinote, & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010), presumably because 
such structural conditions motivate the powerless to move up 
the social hierarchy. These findings, though theoretically 
illuminating, are less applicable to many hierarchies in 
everyday life that are fairly stable and in which power posi-
tions are legitimate. Furthermore, these findings do not 
address whether such structural conditions can improve 
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executive functions of the powerless, which are the key driv-
ers of the performance gap between the powerless and the 
powerful. As such, our knowledge of strategies and interven-
tions that can attenuate the cognitive decrements of the pow-
erless is limited, and the highlighted theoretical and practical 
gaps still exist. To begin redressing these critical gaps, in the 
present work, we propose and demonstrate that self-affirma-
tion—inviting people to cultivate a sense of self as worthy, 
adequate, and efficacious (G. L. Cohen & Sherman, 2014; 
Steele, 1988)—improves inhibitory control, a critical com-
ponent of executive functions, of the powerless. Specifically, 
whereas powerlessness is conceptualized mainly as an inter-
personal and relational construct, we show that an intraper-
sonal intervention, such as self-affirmation, can attenuate the 
detrimental cognitive consequences of powerlessness, and 
enable the powerless to respond adaptively to their circum-
stances in power hierarchies. This implies that the adverse 
personal consequences of being powerless can be neutralized 
even when people are locked in a low-power state in social 
contexts. Our research, therefore, provides a more nuanced 
understanding of the psychology of powerlessness, which 
has received scant attention in the power literature and sheds 
light on ways to minimize the performance gap between the 
powerless and the powerful.
Powerlessness and Impaired Executive 
Functions
Power is defined as the asymmetrical control over valued 
resources and outcomes in social relations (Fiske, 2010). In 
relationships characterized by power asymmetries, the power-
ful have higher access to resources and have the relative 
capacity to influence others’ outcomes by awarding or with-
holding those resources. Higher access to valued resources 
and lower dependency on others increase approach-related 
tendencies and goal-directed behavior of the powerful (Hirsh, 
Galinsky, & Zhong, 2011; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 
2003). In contrast, the powerless have less access to resources, 
and their outcomes are dependent on the powerful. 
Consequently, the powerless feel more constrained and expe-
rience more vigilance, which consumes mental resources and 
hinders performance by impairing executive functions (Dépret 
& Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2008).
Executive functions consist of a family of core interre-
lated cognitive control processes, enabling an individual to 
(a) deliberately allocate and maintain attention to goal-rele-
vant information and inhibit habitual response tendencies to 
distracting stimuli that may disrupt goal pursuit—inhibitory 
control, (b) retain and update goal-relevant information—
working memory, and (c) demonstrate flexibility in shifting 
between different goals and perspectives according to 
changed demands or priorities—cognitive flexibility 
(Diamond, 2013; Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012; 
Miyake et al., 2000). Relating to power asymmetries, spe-
cifically, research has found that lack of power consistently 
impedes inhibitory control, such that relative to the power-
ful, the powerless show decreased ability to focus on goal-
relevant stimuli and to override countervailing impulses and 
interfering distractions (Guinote, 2007a, 2017; Schmid, 
Kleiman, & Amodio, 2015; Smith et al., 2008). As a result, 
the detrimental effects of powerlessness on inhibitory con-
trol have been argued to be at the core of how lacking power 
creates a performance gap between the powerful and the 
powerless (Guinote & Vescio, 2010; Smith et al., 2008).
Although powerlessness is by definition an interpersonal 
construct, in essence, it constitutes a salient threat to people’s 
self-worth, a global and positive perception of the self as 
adequate, capable, and efficacious. Particularly, powerless-
ness—the experience of asymmetrical outcome dependency 
in social relations—threatens people’s innate need to view 
themselves as capable of determining their outcomes (Fiske, 
2010; Guinote, 2017). According to research on self-deter-
mination theory, the feeling that one is agentic and capable of 
achieving goals despite challenges is a fundamental force 
behind performance, goal attainment, and overall well-being 
(Deci & Ryan, 1995; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Therefore, the 
adverse effects of powerlessness on inhibitory control, a crit-
ical component of executive functions, may be driven by the 
threat that asymmetrical outcome dependency poses to indi-
viduals’ positive and efficacious self-view. If so, a different 
scenario may occur when the powerless have the opportunity 
to restore their self-worth. Specifically, such an opportunity 
may enable the powerless to perceive themselves as adequate 
and capable enough to carry out goals despite their disadvan-
taged social position. Accordingly, in the following, we 
argue and propose that self-affirmation is one strategy to buf-
fer the detrimental consequences of powerlessness on inhibi-
tory control.
Self-Affirmation as a Remedy for 
Powerlessness: The When and the How
Psychological threats, like being stigmatized for one’s race, 
socioeconomic status, or gender, challenge people’s innate 
need to view themselves as worthy, capable, and efficacious 
in carrying out goals in daily life (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). 
One of the most frequently studied behavioral interventions 
known to neutralize the adverse effects of psychological 
threats is self-affirmation. Self-affirmation theory hinges on 
the premise that the self-system is flexible to the extent that 
when the self is threatened in one domain, affirming the self 
in a different domain restores a sense of adequacy, which can 
be harnessed to buffer the adverse effects of psychological 
threats (G. L. Cohen & Sherman, 2014).
Research has provided extensive evidence on the positive 
effects of self-affirmation on achievements and performance 
outcomes of stigmatized groups. For instance, field and labo-
ratory studies have found that self-affirmation interventions 
that involve writing about core personal values significantly 
improve the academic performance of minority students, 
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who are often negatively stereotyped for their intellectual 
abilities (G. L. Cohen, Garcia, Purdie-Vaughns, Apfel, & 
Brzustoski, 2009; Taylor & Walton, 2011). In relation to 
one’s socioeconomic status, studies have found that affirma-
tions among first-generation college students, who often 
come from financially disadvantaged backgrounds, increase 
goal-directed intentions and behavior, which ultimately 
reduce the achievement gap between those students and their 
more financially advantaged peers (Harackiewicz et al., 
2014). In a similar vein, research has also found that affirma-
tions reduce the gender gap in learning and performance 
(Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006).
The reviewed findings have important implications for 
our reasoning on why self-affirmation may effectively curb 
the negative cognitive consequences of powerlessness. 
First, the psychological threats reviewed above (e.g., being 
stigmatized for one’s race, social class, and gender) signifi-
cantly overlap with the state of powerlessness and are asso-
ciated with having less control over valued resources and 
outcomes in social relations (Phelan, Lucas, Ridgeway, & 
Taylor, 2014). This notion is supported by findings demon-
strating that being stereotyped increases the feeling of pow-
erlessness (Cook, Arrow, & Malle, 2011). Moreover, similar 
to the effects of powerlessness, research has found that ste-
reotype threats undermine performance by impairing cogni-
tive control abilities (Schmader & Johns, 2003). Given the 
positive effects of self-affirmation on various cognitive out-
comes among stigmatized groups, it is plausible that self-
affirmation also buffers the adverse effects of powerlessness 
on cognitive control. Specifically, by shifting the focus of 
the powerless from their dire state in a power hierarchy to 
the psychological resources residing within the self, self-
affirmation may foster adaptive coping with the conse-
quences of being powerless. We thus hypothesize the 
following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Low-power individuals who self-
affirm show improved inhibitory control abilities, relative 
to low-power individuals who are not given the opportu-
nity to self-affirm.
Although H1 proposes self-affirmation as an intervention 
to improve the inhibitory control component of executive 
functions of the powerless, we also examine when and how 
self-affirmation extends its reparative effect. Specifically, 
with respect to when, following the logic of the self-affirma-
tion theory, we highlight the role of individual differences in 
self-esteem as an important boundary condition of our pro-
posed effect in H1. Dispositional self-esteem is a psychoso-
cial resource which fortifies the self against psychological 
threats. People with high self-esteem (HSE) have a higher 
sense of personal agency, regard themselves as capable of 
carrying out goals, and are more likely to generate self-
affirming thoughts spontaneously when facing threats 
(Dodgson & Wood, 1998; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 
2002; Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012). In contrast, those with 
low self-esteem (LSE) experience more anxiety when facing 
threats and are less likely to readily view themselves as capa-
ble of influencing their environment and overcoming threats 
(Greenberg et al., 1992; Mecca, Smelser, & Vasconcellos, 
1989). Accordingly, research has shown that people with 
LSE, who lack dispositional resources to protect their self-
worth against threats, are those who reap the largest benefit 
from affirmation interventions (Düring & Jessop, 2015; 
Jaremka, Bunyan, Collins, & Sherman, 2011). Individual dif-
ferences in self-esteem thus predict the extent to which peo-
ple need and benefit from external means of bolstering 
self-worth (e.g., through self-affirmations) when experienc-
ing self-threats.
Following this reasoning, we posit that the reparative 
effect of self-affirmation on inhibitory control of the power-
less should be most evident among people with LSE. In con-
trast, people with HSE, who readily regard themselves as 
capable and adequate in facing threats, should benefit less 
from explicit self-affirmation interventions when experienc-
ing the psychological threat of powerlessness. We thus 
propose:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The reparative effect of self-affirma-
tion on inhibitory control of the powerless is more (vs. 
less) pronounced among people with low (vs. high) 
self-esteem.
Finally, concerning the underlying process, we focus on 
the core of how self-affirmation neutralizes the negative con-
sequences of psychological threats. Specifically, self-affir-
mation has been conceptualized to shift people’s attention to 
their positive self-aspects and boost a self-view that is 
resourceful and efficacious. As Steele (1988) concludes, 
self-affirmation is a strategy to bolster and appraise the self 
as “competent, good, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of 
free choice, capable of controlling important outcomes” (p. 
262). This altered self-appraisal can promote a sense of effi-
cacy, motivating people to strive to change their otherwise 
challenging and threatening circumstances. This motiva-
tional account is consistent with a wealth of findings in the 
self-affirmation literature ranging from health to education, 
and organizational psychology. For instance, research has 
found that self-affirmation reduces defensive processing of 
health-risk information among people with high health risk 
and fosters their perceived efficacy and control in adopting 
healthier and more desirable habits (Armitage, Harris, 
Hepton, & Napper, 2008; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000). 
Similarly, in organizations undergoing downsizing where 
employees often experience high levels of job insecurity, 
self-affirmation has been found to reduce anxiety and stress 
by bolstering employees’ perceived efficacy in overcoming 
workplace challenges (Morgan & Harris, 2015). We propose 
that a similar process drives our hypothesized effect. 
Specifically, self-affirmation may cultivate a greater sense of 
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efficacy among the powerless, which in turn improves inhib-
itory control abilities of the powerless. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): A sense of efficacy mediates the 
interaction between social power and self-affirmation on 
inhibitory control.
Overview of the Present Studies
In three studies, we investigate the effectiveness of self-affir-
mation interventions in warding off the negative conse-
quences of powerlessness on inhibitory control. Study 1 
serves as an initial test of our proposed effect and shows that 
self-affirmation improves inhibitory control of the powerless 
indexed by Stroop performance. Study 2 replicates and 
extends our findings from Study 1 using the flanker task as a 
different method to assess inhibitory control. Moreover, in 
Study 2, we examine the role of dispositional self-esteem 
and demonstrate that the effectiveness of self-affirmation on 
inhibitory control abilities of the powerless is most pro-
nounced among people with LSE. Finally, in Study 3, we 
examine the underlying process of this effect and show that 
self-affirmation improves inhibitory control of the powerless 
by reinstating an efficacious self-view.
For each study, the sample size was determined a priori 
using G*Power (v 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 
2009) to have a power of 0.80 and an alpha error probability 
of .05 to detect the hypothesized effect. In Study 1, we took 
an investigative approach to the determination of sample 
size. A power analysis yielded a minimum sample size of 191 
to detect a medium-sized two-way interaction effect (f = 0.2) 
between power and affirmation. In Study 2, power analysis 
for a linear regression yielded a minimum sample of 325 to 
detect a small-sized effect (f2 = 0.03) for the hypothesized 
three-way interaction between power, affirmation, and self-
esteem. Due to its similarity to Study 1, in Study 3, we used 
the effect sizes obtained in Study 1 (f = 0.2). Hence, power 
analysis yielded a minimum sample of 191 for detecting an 
interaction between power and affirmation. Accordingly, for 
each study, we aimed to sample at least the minimum number 
of participants determined by the power analysis, with more 
participants being included if allowed by the allotted labora-
tory time. All our sample sizes exceeded these minima. 
Finally, where relevant, we refer to the supplementary online 
material (SOM) accompanying this article which provides 
the details of all instructions, manipulations, and measures 
used in our studies, as well as additional analyses of our 
data.1
Study 1
The capacity for inhibitory control is typically assessed using 
the Stroop task, in which participants have to actively inhibit 
or override a prepotent response. Particularly, in this task, 
people see series of color words and are asked to deliberately 
ignore the meaning of color words (the distractor) and instead 
focus on the font color in which those words are displayed 
(the target). Given that both the distractor (color word) and 
the target (font color) are features of the same stimulus, 
responding to the font color that conflicts with the color 
word (e.g., color word RED printed in green) usually takes a 
longer time and requires people to exert inhibitory control to 
suppress their primary inclination to respond to the meaning 
of the color word (MacLeod, 1991). In this study, using the 
Stroop task, we provide the initial evidence for our hypoth-
esis (H1) that self-affirmation improves inhibitory control of 
the powerless.
Method
Participants. The sample included data from 205 students 
from a business school (119 males and 86 females2; Mage = 
24.57 years, SD = 3.54 years) who participated in a 2 (power: 
low-power vs. high-power) × 2 (affirmation: self-affirmation 
vs. no-affirmation) between-subjects design experiment.
Procedure. Power was manipulated using the well-estab-
lished “manager-subordinate” role-playing procedure, which 
induces feelings of having and lacking power among partici-
pants through asymmetrical outcome dependency (Guinote, 
2007b). First, participants were led to believe that they would 
be paired with another participant to complete a group task, 
in which each member would be assigned to the role of either 
a manager or a subordinate. Participants completed a short 
questionnaire, ostensibly designed to identify their role (e.g., 
manager or subordinate) in the upcoming group task. In real-
ity, participants did not engage in a group task, and regard-
less of how they responded to the questionnaire, participants 
were randomly assigned to either a high-power (i.e., man-
ager) or a low-power (i.e., subordinate) condition and 
received a description of what their role entailed. In brief, 
participants in the high-power condition learned that they 
would be paired with another participant who would be their 
“subordinate” and that they would supervise, evaluate, and 
judge their subordinate’s performance in a computerized 
problem-solving task. They also learned that they would 
determine which proportion of a designated reward their 
“subordinate” would receive upon completing the task. In 
contrast, participants in the low-power condition learned that 
they would be paired with a “manager,” who would super-
vise and evaluate their performance in a computerized prob-
lem-solving task and that their rewards associated with the 
task would be determined only by their “manager” (for 
details, see SOM).
After the power manipulation, participants were told that 
the activation of the computerized group task would take 
some time. Therefore, while waiting, they were asked to 
complete two different short tasks, independent of their 
upcoming group task. The first task was a self-affirmation 
intervention which was followed by the Stroop task. We 
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adapted the procedure used by Schmeichel and Vohs (2009) 
for our self-affirmation manipulation. Participants in the self-
affirmation condition were asked to rank 11 values in terms 
of personal importance. They were then asked to write why 
their top-ranked value was important to them. Participants in 
the no-affirmation condition saw the same list of values as 
those in the self-affirmation condition did; however, they 
were asked to rank the values in terms of their importance to 
a well-known philanthropist, Bill Gates. Participants then 
wrote why the top-ranked value was important to this philan-
thropist. Therefore, by contemplating the values of another 
person, participants did not have an opportunity to self-
affirm (for details, see SOM).
Following the self-affirmation task, participants were 
asked to complete the color-word Stroop task. Participants 
were instructed to indicate whether color words (e.g., RED, 
YELLOW, or GREEN) were displayed in red, yellow, or 
green font on the screen. Each trial began with a fixation 
cross (+) for 500 ms, followed immediately by a color 
word, and the participant had to respond within 2,000 ms, 
after which the next trial was automatically presented. 
Intertrial intervals were 250 ms, and the task duration was 
approximately 5 min long. Participants first completed eight 
practice trials and then moved on to perform a total of 120 
experimental trials. The experimental trials consisted of 40 
congruent trials (e.g., the word “RED” displayed in red font, 
“YELLOW” in yellow font, and “GREEN” in green font), 
40 incongruent trials (e.g., the word “RED” displayed in 
green font, “YELLOW” in red font, and “GREEN” in yel-
low font), and 40 neutral trials (e.g., “XXXX” displayed in 
red, yellow, or green). Responses were collected by the 
press of predefined keys corresponding to font colors, where 
the key “R” was for the red font, the key “Y” was for the 
yellow font, and the key “G” was for the green font. Trials 
were randomly presented, and performance feedback was 
not provided in either the practice or the experimental part.
After completing the Stroop task and before the presum-
able group task, participants specified their age, gender, and 
completed the Positive and Negative Affective Schedule 
(PANAS3; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), Fear of 
Negative Evaluation4 scale (Leary, 1983), and manipulation 
check questions. Finally, participants were debriefed, 
thanked, and paid for their participation.
Results
Power manipulation check. Using two 9-point scales (1 = not 
at all, 9 = very much), each participant indicated the extent 
to which they felt (a) themselves and (b) their group member 
to have control over outcomes. By measuring relative (self 
vs. other) feelings of outcome control, this method provides 
a particular advantage in verifying the successful induction 
of power as a relational construct in social contexts. As 
expected, results of a 2 (power: low-power vs. high-power; 
between-subjects) × 2 (affirmation: self-affirmation vs. 
no-affirmation; between-subjects) × 2 (target: self vs. other; 
within-subjects) mixed-design analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) revealed a significant interaction between power 
and target, F(1, 201) = 149.77, p < .001, ηp
2 43= . , such that 
high-power participants felt to have more control over out-
comes (Mself = 6.32, SD = 1.95), than they did their group 
member to have, Mother = 3.67, SD = 1.85; F(1, 201) = 
83.17, p < .001, ηp
2 29= . , 95% CIMean-Difference = [2.08, 
3.22]. Conversely, low-power participants felt to have less 
control over outcomes (Mself = 4.30, SD = 2.29) than they 
did their group member to have (Mother = 6.70, SD = 2.13, 
F(1, 201) = 67.07, p < .001, ηp
2 25= . , 95% CIMean-Difference = 
[−2.97, –1.82]). No other effect was significant in the mixed-
design ANOVA (Fs < 1, ps > .53). These results show that 
feelings of having and lacking power were successfully 
induced among participants through asymmetrical control 
over resources and that self-affirmation did not influence 
participants’ relative feeling of power.5
Stroop performance. Inhibitory control in this task is indexed 
by Stroop interference,6 which is calculated by subtracting 
each participant’s average response latencies (in millisec-
onds) on neutral trials from incongruent trials. Lower Stroop 
interference scores thus indicate greater ability to override 
one’s dominant response tendencies (i.e., greater inhibitory 
control). We subjected participants’ Stroop interference 
scores to a 2 (power: low-power vs. high-power) × 2 (affir-
mation: self-affirmation vs. no-affirmation) between-sub-
jects ANOVA. Results revealed a main effect of power, F(1, 
201) = 7.75, p = .006, ηp
2 04= . , a main effect of affirma-
tion, F(1, 201) = 8.45, p = .004, ηp
2 04= . , and the expected 
two-way interaction between power and affirmation, F(1, 
201) = 7.19, p = .008, ηp
2 04= .  (see Figure 1).
As predicted, low-power participants who affirmed 
showed less Stroop interference (M = 59.75, SD = 64.16) 
than did the powerless in the no-affirmation condition, M = 
116.04, SD = 78.52; F(1, 201) = 15.55, p < .001, d = 0.79, 
95% CIMean-Difference = [−84.45, –28.14]. However, among 
participants in the high-power condition, there was no sig-
nificant difference in Stroop interference between those who 
affirmed (M = 58.73, SD = 75.87) and those who did not, M 
= 60.99, SD = 68.89, F < 1, p = .87, d = 0.03, 95% CIMean-
Difference = [−30.28, 25.76].
Looked at differently, in the no-affirmation condition, con-
sistent with past findings, low-power participants showed 
greater Stroop interference (M = 116.04, SD = 78.52) than 
did high-power participants, M = 60.99, SD = 68.89, F(1, 
201) = 14.87, p < .001, d = 0.75, 95% CIMean-Difference = 
[26.90, 83.21]. However, this performance gap was eliminated 
in the self-affirmation condition, as there was no significant 
difference in Stroop interference between low-power (M = 
59.75, SD = 64.16) and high-power participants, M = 58.73, 
SD = 75.87, F < 1, p = .94, d = 0.01, 95% CIMean-Difference = 
[−26.99, 29.04].
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Discussion
Results of Study 1 are consistent with our proposition that self-
affirmation improves inhibitory control of the powerless (H1). 
Compared with the powerless who did not affirm, the power-
less who affirmed their core personal values showed marked 
improvement in their ability to inhibit their dominant response 
tendencies in the Stroop task. Furthermore, affirmation elimi-
nated the cognitive performance gap between the powerless 
and the powerful. When affirmed, the powerless were able to 
suppress their impulses to a level equivalent to that of the pow-
erful. Finally, in contrast to the powerless, affirmations did not 
further improve the performance of the powerful in the Stroop 
task. This is consistent with conceptualization of and past find-
ings in the self-affirmation theory (see G. L. Cohen & Sherman, 
2014) suggesting that affirmation interventions are most effec-
tive for people under psychological threat (i.e., the powerless).
Although the results of this study underscore the effec-
tiveness of self-affirmation in improving inhibitory control 
abilities of the powerless, they also leave open the possibility 
that merely having power may have enhanced participants’ 
inhibitory control, irrespective of their affirmation condi-
tions. Therefore, we added a control group to our design in 
Study 2 to address this concern.
Study 2
In Study 2, we conceptually replicate and extend our find-
ings from the previous study in several important ways. First, 
we use a different task to assess inhibitory control, namely 
the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), which has been 
previously used in relation to power asymmetries and inhibi-
tory control abilities (Schmid et al., 2015). In a standard 
version of the flanker task, participants are tested on their 
ability to ignore distracting cues and to maintain their atten-
tion on goal-relevant cues within their visual field. Given 
that lack of power hampers optimal goal pursuit by reducing 
people’s ability to disregard peripheral information (Guinote, 
2007a), we expected that self-affirmation increases the pow-
erless’ ability to ignore distracting cues and to maintain their 
attention on goal-relevant cues. Second, in this study, we test 
our second hypothesis by examining the role of dispositional 
self-esteem as an important boundary condition of our effect. 
We expected that the powerless with LSE would reap the 
largest benefit from self-affirmation.
Method
Participants and design. A total of 377 students from a busi-
ness school participated in a 3 (power: low-power vs. high-
power vs. control; between-subjects) × 2 (affirmation: 
self-affirmation vs. no-affirmation; between-subjects) × 
self-esteem (continuous) experiment. One participant was 
excluded from the final analysis due to missing flanker data. 
Therefore, we conducted the final analyses on data obtained 
from 376 participants (150 males and 226 females; Mage = 
24.92 years, SD = 3.90 years).
Procedure. Ten days to a week before the experiment, partici-
pants completed a short online questionnaire including 
Rosenberg’s (1965) 10-item self-esteem scale (α = .86) and 
demographic questions (e.g., gender, age). On the day of the 
lab session, participants were randomly assigned to the high-
power, low-power, or control (power-neutral) condition. 
Power was manipulated using the same procedure outlined 
Figure 1. Stroop interference in milliseconds for each experimental condition in Study 1.
Note. Error bars denote ±1 standard error of the mean.
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in Study 1. In addition, participants in the control group were 
led to believe that they would be working on a group task 
with another participant and that they both would receive the 
designated reward after completion of the task, thus creating 
a perception of equal control over resources (see SOM).
Following the power manipulation, participants were 
randomly assigned to either a self-affirmation or a no-affir-
mation condition. In both conditions, participants were 
asked to rank 11 personal values. In the self-affirmation con-
dition, they wrote why their top-ranked value was important 
to them. Conversely, in the no-affirmation condition, they 
wrote about why the value ranked ninth might be important 
to an average university student. Thus, by contemplating 
their opinions on a belief they did not strongly hold, partici-
pants did not have an opportunity to self-affirm (McQueen 
& Klein, 2006).
Following the self-affirmation manipulation, participants 
completed a modified version of the flanker task. Each trial 
of the flanker task consisted of congruent (nine arrows point-
ing in the same direction), incongruent (middle arrow 
pointed in the opposite direction of four flanking arrows on 
each side), or neutral (a middle arrow flanked by four boxes 
on each side) stimuli. Each trial began with a central fixation 
cross which remained on the screen for 500 ms followed by 
the stimulus which lasted until the participant made a 
response or for 2,000 ms if no response occurred. The stimu-
lus was followed by a 250 ms intertrial blank screen. 
Participants completed 12 practice trials first, followed by 
120 randomly presented experimental trials, consisting of 40 
congruent, 40 incongruent, and 40 neutral trials. Participants 
were instructed to focus on the middle arrow and press the 
“A” key (on the left side of the keyboard) when the arrow is 
pointed left and press the “L” key (on the right side of the 
keyboard) when the arrow is pointed right. Performance 
feedback was not provided on either the practice or experi-
mental trials. Finally, after participants completed the 
PANAS and manipulation check questions, they were 
debriefed, thanked, and paid.
Results
Flanker performance. We calculated the distractor 
 interference by subtracting average response latencies (in 
milliseconds) of neutral trials from average response 
 latencies of incongruent trials. Lower distractor interference 
scores thus indicate greater ability to exert attentional control 
and to ignore distracting and peripheral information (i.e., 
 flanking arrows). Distractor interference scores were sub-
jected to a 3 (power: low vs. high vs. control) × 2 (affirma-
tion: self-affirmation vs. no-affirmation) between-subjects 
ANOVA. Results revealed a main effect of power, F(2, 370) 
= 9.39, p < .001, ηp
2 05= . , a main effect of affirmation, 
F(1, 370) = 10.44, p = .001, ηp
2 03= . , and the critical two-
way interaction between power and affirmation, F(2, 370) = 
4.38, p = .013, ηp
2 02= .  (see Figure 2).
As predicted, low-power participants in the self-affirma-
tion condition showed significantly less distractor interfer-
ence (M = 46.42, SD = 40.47), than did their powerless 
counterparts in the no-affirmation condition, M = 76.37, SD 
= 54.35, F(1, 370) = 18.60, p < .001, d = 0.63, 95% CIMean-
Difference = [−43.61, –16.30]. However, among the high-power 
participants, there was no significant difference in distractor 
interference whether they had affirmed (M = 40.20, SD = 
28.17) or not, M = 45.54, SD = 37.22, F < 1, p = .45, d = 
0.16, 95% CIMean-Difference = [−19.23, 8.54]. Likewise, for par-
ticipants in the control condition, distractor interference did 
Figure 2. Distractor interference in milliseconds for each experimental condition in Study 2.
Note. Error bars denote ±1 standard error of the mean.
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not differ significantly, whether they had affirmed (M = 
40.86, SD = 32.80) or not, M = 44.85, SD = 36.40, F < 1, 
p = .57, d = 0.12, 95% CIMean-Difference = [−17.87, 9.88].
Moreover, in the no-affirmation condition, low-power par-
ticipants showed greater distractor interference (M = 76.37, 
SD = 54.35) than did participants in the high-power, M = 
45.54, SD = 37.22, F(1, 370) = 19.86, p < .001, d = 0.66, 
95% CIMean-Difference = [17.23, 44.44], and control conditions, 
M = 44.85, SD = 36.40, F(1, 370) = 20.43, p < .001, d = 
0.68, 95% CIMean-Difference = [17.81, 45.24]. However, in the 
self-affirmation condition, there was no significant difference 
in distractor interference between the low-power (M = 46.42, 
SD = 40.47) and high-power participants, M = 40.20, SD = 
28.17, F < 1, p = .38, d = 0.18, 95% CIMean-Difference = [−7.72, 
20.15], and control conditions, M = 40.86, SD = 32.80; F < 
1, p = .43, d = 0.15, 95% CIMean-Difference = [−8.26, 19.38], 
suggesting that self-affirmation eliminated the performance 
gap between participants in the low-power and those in the 
high-power and control conditions.
The interplay between self-esteem, self-affirmation, and power. We 
proposed that the reparative effect of self-affirmation on 
inhibitory control would be most pronounced among the 
powerless with LSE. Using the general linear model process, 
we examined the effect of power, affirmation, self-esteem 
(centered), and all the two- and three-way interactions on dis-
tractor interference.7 Results revealed a significant main 
effect of power, F(2, 364) = 8.40, p < .001, ηp
2 04= . , 
and affirmation, F(1, 364) = 10.19, p = .002, ηp
2 03= . . The 
main effect of self-esteem was not significant, F(1, 364) = 
1.89, p = .17, ηp
2 005= . . Moreover, results revealed signifi-
cant two-way interactions between power and affirmation, 
F(2, 364) = 4.09, p = .02, ηp
2 02= . , and power and self-
esteem, F(2, 364) = 4.04, p = .02, ηp
2 02= . . The interaction 
effect between affirmation and self-esteem was not signifi-
cant, F < 1, p = .50, ηp
2 001= . . Most critically, and as pre-
dicted, results revealed a significant power × affirmation × 
self-esteem interaction, F(2, 364) = 4.38, p = .01, ηp
2 02= . .
Following Aiken and West (1991), we decomposed the 
three-way interaction using a series of regressions to test our 
proposition (H2). As predicted, in the no-affirmation condition 
and under the condition of LSE (evaluated at 1 SD below the 
mean), low-power participants showed greater distractor inter-
ference than did high-power participants, b = 54.76, SE = 
8.84, t(364) = 6.19, p < .001, 95% CI = [37.37, 72.15], and 
participants in the control condition, b = 50.31, SE = 9.99, 
t(364) = 5.03, p < .001, 95% CI = [30.66, 69.97]. Importantly 
however, and as expected, among those with LSE, who had the 
opportunity to self-affirm, the performance of low-power par-
ticipants did not significantly differ from that of high-power, b 
= 5.36, SE = 9.63, t(364) = 0.56, p = .58, 95% CI = [−13.58, 
24.30], and control participants, b = 4.14, SE = 10.59, t(364) 
= 0.39, p = .70, 95% CI = [−16.70, 24.97]. These findings 
demonstrate that for people with LSE who are most vulnerable 
to psychological threats, self-affirmation effectively curbs neg-
ative consequences of powerlessness on inhibitory control and 
reduces the performance gap between the powerless and peo-
ple in the high-power and control conditions (see Figure 3).
Furthermore, among participants with HSE (evaluated at 
1 SD above the mean), who did not affirm, there was no sig-
nificant difference in distractor interference between low-
power participants and those in the high-power, b = 2.76, SE 
= 9.72, t(364) = 0.28, p = .78, 95% CI = [−16.36, 21.88] 
and control conditions, b = 10.41, SE = 9.37, t(364) = 1.11, 
p = .27, 95% CI = [−8.00, 28.83]. Likewise, among partici-
pants with HSE who affirmed, there was no significant dif-
ference in distractor interference between the low-power and 
those in the high-power, b = 6.16, SE = 10.25, t(364) = 
0.60, p = .55, 95% CI = [−13.99, 26.32], and control condi-
tions, b = 5.54, SE = 10.13, t(364) = 0.55, p = .58, 95% CI 
= [−14.38, 25.47]. Thus, among those with HSE, perfor-
mance was unhindered and self-affirmation did not further 
improve participants’ cognitive control.
Discussion
Results of Study 2 corroborate our findings from Study 1 by 
showing that self-affirmation improves inhibitory control of 
the powerless. Furthermore, consistent with past findings 
and conceptualizations in the self-affirmation literature (G. 
L. Cohen & Sherman, 2014), affirmations do not improve 
inhibitory control abilities of the powerful and people in the 
control condition, whose self-worth is not threatened. Our 
results also demonstrate that being powerless, rather than 
being powerful, drives this effect, as we did not observe dif-
ferences in cognitive performance between the powerful and 
people in the control condition.
Moreover, we highlighted the boundaries of this effect by 
examining the role of dispositional self-resources. Specifically, 
low-power participants with LSE who did not have the oppor-
tunity to self-affirm showed less ability in deploying inhibitory 
control, compared with participants in other conditions. 
However, as predicted in H2, the powerless with LSE benefited 
most from the self-affirmation intervention. Indeed, the perfor-
mance gap between the powerless with LSE and participants in 
the high-power and control conditions diminished when the 
powerless had the opportunity to self-affirm. Overall, these 
findings suggest that power, self-affirmation, and self-esteem 
combine synergistically to affect inhibitory control. Importantly, 
relative to participants in the high-power and control condi-
tions, the low-power participants showed no performance dec-
rements when they either had the opportunity to self-affirm or 
were equipped with dispositional self-resources.8
Study 3
In Study 3, we replicate our main finding in the previous stud-
ies that self-affirmation improves inhibitory control of the 
powerless and test the underlying process of this effect. 
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Specifically, consistent with our reasoning and as explicated in 
H3, we test whether the reparative effect of self-affirmation on 
inhibitory control of the powerless is explained through an 
increased sense of efficacy—the belief that one can carry out 
goals and influence the environment despite challenges.
Method
Participants. In total, 221 students from a business school (97 
males and 124 females; Mage = 24.92 years, SD = 3.94 
years) participated in a 2 (power: low-power vs. high-power) 
× 2 (affirmation: self-affirmation vs. no-affirmation) 
between-subjects design.
Procedure. First, power was manipulated using the same method 
outlined in Study 1. Next, participants were randomly assigned 
to either a self-affirmation or a no-affirmation condition. To 
generalize our findings across different self-affirmation manip-
ulations, in this study, we asked participants to write about a 






























































Figure 3. Distractor interference in milliseconds as a function of power, self-affirmation, and self-esteem (Study 2): (a) no-affirmation 
and (b) self-affirmation.
Note. “High” and “low” levels of self-esteem refer to 1 SD above and below the mean, respectively.
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different self-affirmation interventions, recalling acts of kind-
ness was found to be an effective means of affirming the self 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006). In the self-affirmation condition, 
participants wrote about a time they helped another individual. 
Specifically, participants were asked to write about who the per-
son they helped was, what the problem was, what they did, and 
how they felt about it. In contrast, participants in the no-affirma-
tion condition were asked to recall and write about an instance 
when they had to do their laundry.
Following the affirmation manipulation, participants 
completed a 4-item scale, adopted from Lachman and 
Weaver (1998), intended to capture the perceived sense of 
efficacy. Specifically, the scale measures “one’s sense of 
efficacy and effectiveness in carrying out goals” (Lachman 
& Weaver, 1998). The items (e.g., “Whether or not I am 
able to get what I want is in my own hands” and “I can do 
just about anything I really set my mind to”) were measured 
using 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree) and were averaged (α = .91) to form an index of 
sense of efficacy. Next, participants completed the Stroop 
task as outlined in Study 1. Finally, participants specified 
their age and gender, and completed the PANAS, and 
manipulation check questions, before they were debriefed, 
thanked, and paid.
Results
Stroop performance. A 2 (power: low-power vs. high-power) 
× 2 (affirmation: self-affirmation vs. no-affirmation) 
between-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of power, 
F(1, 217) = 8.51, p = .004, ηp
2 04= . , but no effect of affir-
mation, F(1, 217) = 2.63, p = .11, ηp
2 01= . , on 
Figure 4. Stroop interference in milliseconds for each experimental condition in Study 3.
Note. Error bars denote ±1 standard error of the mean.
Stroop interference. Importantly, results revealed the critical 
two-way interaction between power and affirmation on 
Stroop interference, F(1, 217) = 10.81, p = .001, ηp
2 05= .  
(see Figure 4).
As predicted, low-power participants who affirmed 
showed significantly less Stroop interference (M = 71.90, 
SD = 60.91) than did the powerless in the no-affirmation 
condition, M = 119.66, SD = 85.51, F(1, 217) = 12.10, p = 
.001, d = 0.64, 95% CIMean-Difference = [−74.82, –20.70]. 
However, among the high-power participants, there was no 
significant difference in Stroop interference whether they 
affirmed (M = 75.51, SD = 76.04) or not, M = 59.29, SD = 
63.62, F(1, 217) = 1.38, p = .24, d = 0.23, 95% CIMean-
Difference = [−10.97, 43.41].
Furthermore, in the no-affirmation condition, consistent 
with past findings, the powerless showed greater Stroop 
interference (M = 119.66, SD = 85.51) than did the power-
ful, M = 59.29, SD = 63.62, F(1, 217) = 19.15, p < .001, d 
= 0.80, 95% CIMean-Difference = [33.18, 87.56]. However, 
among participants who affirmed, there was no significant 
difference in Stroop interference between the low-power (M 
= 71.90, SD = 60.91) and high-power participants, M = 
75.51, SD = 76.04, F < 1, p = .79, d = 0.05, 95% CIMean-
Difference = [−30.67, 23.45], indicating that self-affirmation 
eliminated the cognitive performance gap between the pow-
erless and the powerful.
Sense of efficacy. Results of a 2 (power: low-power vs. high-
power) × 2 (affirmation: self-affirmation vs. no-affirmation) 
between-subjects ANOVA on participants’ sense of efficacy 
revealed a main effect of power, F(1, 217) = 6.49, p = .012, 
ηp
2 03= . , a main effect of affirmation, F(1, 217) = 4.66, p = 
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.03, ηp
2 02= . , and critically the expected power × affirma-
tion, F(1, 217) = 19.86, p < .001, ηp
2 08= . . In the low-
power condition, self-affirmation significantly increased 
participants’ sense of efficacy relative to those who did not 
affirm, Mself-affirmation = 5.42, SD = 0.93 vs. Mno-affirmation = 
4.49, SD = 1.28, F(1, 217) = 21.99, p < .001, d = 0.83, 
95% CIMean-Difference = [0.54, 1.31]. However, in the high-
power condition, affirmation did not significantly alter par-
ticipants’ sense of efficacy, Mself-affirmation = 5.15, SD = 0.98 
vs. Mno-affirmation = 5.47, SD = 0.90, F(1, 217) = 2.63, p = 
.11, d = 0.34, 95% CIMean-Difference = [−0.71, 0.07].
Sense of efficacy as the mediator. We used Hayes’ (2013) 
PROCESS macro (Model 8) to test our proposition that affir-
mation among the powerless promotes an efficacious self-
view, which in turn improves inhibitory control. A 
5,000-resampled percentile bootstrap revealed a significant 
indirect effect of power × affirmation on Stroop interference 
via perceived sense of efficacy, index of moderated media-
tion = 30.45, SE = 9.51, 95% CI = [13.99, 51.03]. As 
expected, feeling efficacious mediated the effect of self-affir-
mation (vs. no-affirmation) on Stroop interference among 
low-power participants, b = −22.60, SE = 6.93, 95% CI = 
[−37.47, –10.26], but not among the high-power participants, 
b = 7.85, SE = 4.89, 95% CI = [−0.51, 18.82]. Furthermore, 
the interaction effect of power and affirmation on Stroop 
interference became nonsignificant when efficacy was 
accounted for in the model, bpower× affirmation = 33.52, SE = 
19.08, t(216) = 1.76, p = .08, 95% CI = [−4.09, 71.14].
Discussion
Results of this study provide further support that self-affir-
mation improves inhibitory control of the powerless. 
Moreover, consistent with our reasoning, we found that self-
affirmation improves cognitive performance of the power-
less by promoting an efficacious self-view, whereby they see 
themselves sufficiently capable of carrying out goals despite 
their outcome dependency.
General Discussion
Powerlessness is an inescapable constituent of many social 
relations. Critically, powerlessness has been found to consis-
tently hamper inhibitory control, a critical component of 
executive functions, and a key predictor of goal-directed 
behavior, career success, health, and well-being throughout 
the lifespan (Diamond, 2013; Guinote, 2017; Smith et al., 
2008). Across three experiments, we provided consistent evi-
dence that self-affirmation attenuates the previously docu-
mented decrements in inhibitory control of the powerless. 
Specifically, we found that affirming core personal values 
(Studies 1 and 2) or attributes (Study 3) enhances cognitive 
control of the powerless in overriding impulsive tendencies 
(i.e., Stroop task) and in disregarding peripheral and goal-
irrelevant information (i.e., flanker task), to a level compa-
rable with that of the powerful.
In addition, consistent with the logic of the self-affirma-
tion theory, our findings shed light on when (Study 2) and 
how (Study 3) self-affirmation extends its reparative effect 
on inhibitory control of the powerless. With respect to 
“when,” we found that the reparative effect of self-affirma-
tion was most evident among the powerless with LSE, sug-
gesting that self-affirmation substitutes and compensates for 
the motivational effects of dispositional self-resources in 
warding off detrimental consequences of powerlessness on 
cognitive performance. Furthermore, we addressed the ques-
tion of “how” by showing that self-affirmation promotes an 
efficacious self-view among the powerless which in turn 
improves inhibitory control.
Together, our findings contribute to the existing literature 
on the social psychology of power as well as the self-affirma-
tion literature in several important ways. First, research on 
social power has mainly focused on the outcomes and advan-
tages of having power. As a result, less is known about the 
psychology of lacking power and particularly about strate-
gies and interventions that could mitigate the cognitive and 
self-regulatory decrements of powerless people. The current 
study is the first to address this theoretical gap by testing the 
notion that the cognitive performance gap in power relations 
can be effectively reduced through well-established self-
affirmation interventions. Our findings are consistent with 
the notion that powerlessness, though inherently a relational 
construct, acts as a psychological threat to one’s self-worth, 
similar to how various stereotype threats do. As such, the 
detrimental effects of lacking power on cognition and perfor-
mance can be effectively neutralized through intrapersonal 
interventions that bolster self-worth.
Furthermore, our findings echo recent theorizing that 
highlights the role of autonomy in power relations. 
Specifically, Lammers, Stoker, Rink, and Galinsky (2016) 
have empirically demonstrated that the need to have control 
over one’s own outcomes, as opposed to others’ outcomes, 
drives the desire for social power. In other words, people 
seek power in social relations because it provides them with 
autonomy and liberates them from others’ influence. Once 
the autonomy is reinstated through means other than having 
power, the desire for power is quenched (see also Inesi, 
Botti, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2011). Our findings may 
be interpreted through this perspective where affirmations 
bolster an efficacious self-view, whereby the powerless, 
despite their lower position in the social hierarchy, view 
themselves as adequate and capable of carrying out goals. 
This reinstated efficacious self-view in turn buffers the neg-
ative consequences of lacking power and enables the power-
less to perform optimally in pursuit of goals.
Moreover, although much is known about the reparative 
effects of self-affirmation in coping with various psychological 
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threats, less is known about the process underlying those 
effects. Recent reviews of the affirmation literature conclude 
that processes underlying self-affirmation effects are highly 
context-dependent, and there is no one-for-all mediator of self-
affirmation effects (G. L. Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Sherman, 
2013). Consequently, in our attempt at uncovering the effects 
of affirmations, we adhere to the motivational underpinning of 
self-affirmation (i.e., increased sense of efficacy) in curbing the 
detrimental effects of powerlessness on cognitive performance. 
Our findings, therefore, inform and broaden the current under-
standing of mechanisms through which self-affirmation pro-
motes resilience and adaptive coping.
The present set of studies has some limitations that future 
research can help resolve. First, while the present studies 
demonstrate that self-affirmations facilitate cognitive per-
formance of the powerless, must strategies that improve per-
formance always be in the form of affirmations? An 
intriguing research possibility, aiming at reducing the per-
formance gap between the powerless and the powerful, 
would be to investigate the role of other psychosocial 
resources that could reinstate feelings of efficacy among the 
powerless. For instance, there has been some research on the 
effects of social support on environmental stressors (e.g., 
Schnall, Harber, Stefanucci, & Proffitt, 2008), such that 
people who engage in group activities accrue benefits that 
strengthen their resolve and augments their capacity to cope 
with threats (G. L. Cohen & Sherman, 2014). This happens 
because social systems are in and of themselves sources of 
power and control (Adler & Kwon, 2002) and people with 
strong social capital are shielded from environmental stress-
ors through the support they receive from others (Ensel & 
Lin, 1991). Social support, therefore, might potentially 
compensate for the lack of other self-related resources such 
as power. This possibility is especially relevant for organi-
zations where social support systems in the form of teams 
play a crucial role in individual and team success (D. Cohen, 
Prusak, & Prusak, 2001).
Second, in the current research, we focused on one of the 
core facets of executive functions: inhibitory control. Our 
motivation for doing so was mainly driven by the abundance 
of prior research and conceptualizations in the social psy-
chology of power evincing that lack of power impedes inhib-
itory control abilities (Guinote, 2007a, 2017; Schmid et al., 
2015; Smith et al., 2008). Future research could help disam-
biguate the effects of interventions such as self-affirmation 
on other facets of executive functioning among the power-
less, such as working memory and cognitive flexibility.
Third, in the current set of studies, power was systemati-
cally manipulated using the well-established role-playing 
task. We used this manipulation throughout our studies 
because it ties in with the definition of power as the asym-
metrical control over outcomes in social relations. However, 
using the same manipulation across studies may raise the 
question of whether our results generalize to other types of 
power manipulations. Thus, future research may profitably 
explore whether similar findings are obtained when power is 
induced using other methods such as variants of the dictator 
game (e.g., Sivanathan, Pillutla, & Murnighan, 2008) or 
through a recall task (e.g., Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 
2003) while considering ease of retrieval for the success of 
this specific manipulation (Lammers, Dubois, Rucker, & 
Galinsky, 2017).
Another important research question is whether low-power 
people spontaneously seek opportunities to recruit alternative 
resources to cope with the psychological threat of being power-
less, or whether they need to be assisted by societal interven-
tions. The marked effect of powerlessness on cognitive control 
in our no-affirmation conditions suggest that the spontaneity of 
recruiting alternative resources is rare. However, the critical 
moderating role of dispositional self-resources, such as self-
esteem in our Study 2, suggests otherwise. Although our results 
in Study 2 do not directly address how HSE safeguards cogni-
tive performance of the powerless, we speculate that disposi-
tional self-resources facilitate generation of self-affirming 
thoughts spontaneously under threat (Dodgson & Wood, 1998; 
Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012). Future research may test our con-
jecture more in detail by examining the interactive effect of 
power and self-esteem and its underlying process in shaping 
cognitive control. Finally, taking a broader theoretical perspec-
tive, results of Study 2 are also consistent with the notion that 
psychosocial resources are fungible and that dispositional (e.g., 
self-esteem), intrapersonal (e.g., self-affirmation), and interper-
sonal (e.g., social power) sources of self-worth are substitutable 
for optimal adaptation and performance (Hobfoll, 2002; Tesser, 
2000). Future research may, therefore, fruitfully examine the 
exchangeability of other self-resources for individuals’ perfor-
mance and goal pursuit in the context of power asymmetries.
Conclusion
Inhibitory control is central to attention regulation, impulse 
control, and goal pursuit. Lack of power impairs inhibitory 
control abilities, resulting in a performance gap between the 
powerless and the powerful. Bridging the research streams 
on social power and self-affirmation, in the present research, 
we proposed and provided converging evidence that affirma-
tions curb the negative consequences of powerlessness on 
inhibitory control by promoting a more efficacious self-view 
among the powerless.
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Notes
1. Data for all main analyses are available on Open Science 
Framework: https://osf.io/58u4h/?view_only=ceaee85de8ab4a
77a509e52cc2f0b9af
2. In all three studies and to ensure the robustness of our findings, 
we reanalyzed data including gender as an additional factor. We 
did not find any gender effects and the pattern and significance 
of our findings did not change. Details of gender-related analy-
ses are provided in the supplementary online material (SOM).
3. Across all three studies, participants’ affective states were not 
modulated by power, affirmation, or their interaction. Moreover, 
including participants’ affect scores as covariates did not influ-
ence the significance or the pattern of our main findings. These 
results rule out mood repair as an alternative explanation for the 
reparative effect of self-affirmation on cognitive abilities of the 
powerless. Details of these analyses are provided in the SOM.
4. We also measured fear of negative evaluation (FNE) in this 
study. However, our power and affirmation manipulations did 
not predict participants’ FNE. As with PANAS, these results 
suggest that an affect-based explanation is unlikely to account 
for the process underlying our proposed effect. Results of this 
analysis are explicated in the SOM.
5. Across all studies, power was successfully manipulated. 
Analyses related to the power manipulation check of Studies 2 
and 3 can be found in the SOM.
6. Details pertained to the preliminary inspection of response laten-
cies and treatment of any outlying latencies are provided in the 
SOM. Furthermore, in Studies 1 and 3 where we used the Stroop 
task, analysis of Stroop interference in errors revealed no effect 
of power, affirmation, or their interaction on errors. Moreover, 
controlling for Stroop interference in errors did not change the 
pattern or significance of our findings in these studies, sug-
gesting that the improved performance of the powerless, after 
self-affirmation, is not merely attributable to providing speeded 
responses (a strategy that would have rendered more errors), but 
is the result of more efficient deployment of executive control 
to override impulses. See SOM for a detailed analysis of error 
rates.
7. Although we measured self-esteem at least 7 days prior to the 
experiment, to ensure that our power and affirmation manipula-
tions did not predict dispositional self-esteem, we ran an analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA) with power and self-affirmation as 
independent variables and self-esteem as a dependent variable. 
Results of this analysis revealed no significant interaction effect 
of power and affirmation on self-esteem, F(2, 370) = 1.72, p = 
.18, confirming successful random assignment.
8. Similar to past findings (Jaremka, Bunyan, Collins, & Sherman, 
2011), people with high self-esteem (HSE) in our study did not 
benefit from self-affirmation. This may be because these people 
did not perceive a threat when assigned to the powerless con-
dition, or alternatively that they were able to cope adaptively 
with the threat of being powerless due to their dispositional self-
resources. The former possibility suggests that dispositional 
self-esteem might have influenced participants’ perception of 
relative power in our study. Although none of these possibilities 
undermines our H2 which highlighted low self-esteem (LSE; 
and not HSE) as the most fertile ground for the reparative effect 
of self-affirmation among the powerless, we ran an extra analy-
sis to examine whether self-esteem interfered with our power 
manipulation. To this end, using the two manipulation check 
questions, we created a relative social power score by subtract-
ing participants’ perception of control over their group member 
(i.e., other) from that of their own (i.e., self) and subjected this 
score to a general linear model with power, affirmation, self-
esteem (centered), and all the two- and three-way interactions 
as predictors. As expected, dispositional self-esteem did not 
have a significant main effect, nor did it interact with power 
and affirmation (Fs < 2.64, ps > .11) to predict relative feel-
ings of power. This suggests that participants’ self-esteem did 
not interfere with their perceived power in our study, but higher 
self-esteem enabled the powerless to cope adaptively with nega-
tive consequences of powerlessness.
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material is available online with this article.
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